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NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle 
as a key component of the Constellation program which 
will provide safe and reliable transportation to the 
International Space Station, back to the moon, and later 
to Mars. The risks and costs of the Ares I must be 
significantly lowered, as compared to other manned 
launch vehicles, to enable the continuation of space 
exploration. It is essential that safety be significantly 
improved, and cost-effectively incorporated into the 
design process.  This paper justifies early and effective 
safety analysis of complex space systems. Interactions 
and dependences between design, logistics, modeling, 
reliability, and safety engineers will be discussed to 
illustrate methods to lower cost, reduce design cycles and 
lessen the likelihood of catastrophic events. 
 
1. MOTIVATION FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
Why is it essential to improve the overall safety of space 
systems and reduce the costs?  The answer is simple: 
public expectations.  The public must clearly understand 
that the benefits of space exploration outweigh the risks 
and costs in order to support long-term space exploration. 
This paper will not address the benefits of space 
exploration, but will address how to reduce the risks and 
costs to increase the general population’s support of 
space exploration. The public generally has a limited 
understanding of the magnitude of risks or costs 
associated with space exploration.  The current Space 
Shuttles use three Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME), 
and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) to generate a 
combined 6.3 million pounds (28.0 million newtons) of 
thrust at liftoff and use a combined 535,000 gallons (2.03 
million liters) of liquid propellants and roughly 2.2 
million pounds (0.98 million kilograms) of solid 
propellants in less than ten minutes [1] to achieve orbit.  
The average person has little or nothing to compare this 
energy output to.  Just the thrust from the two SRBs are 
compared to “14,700 six-axle diesel locomotives” [2] in 
one NASA publication.  It is very unlikely that the 
average person has ever seen one hundred, much less a 
thousand, locomotives passing at one time. The public 
also does not fully understand the harsh environment of 
space such as the vacuum of space, temperature 
extremes, and operational limitations which drive the 
complexity of space systems.  Similar challenges are 
encountered by those engaged in or designing submarine/ 
deep-ocean exploration and high altitude flight systems.  
However, this is a relative small portion of the population 
employed in these high-risk professions. 
  
1.1 Public Safety Perception 
 
The world population is generally trending towards being 
more risk-adverse.  Just looking at historical data we can 
see this trend.  During World War II, between 1939 and 
1945, an estimated 16 millions Americans died as a 
direct result of that conflict. However, since the 
beginning of US operations in Iraq beginning in 2003, 
only an estimated 4,177 have died and there has been 
30,633 wounded as September 2008 [3]. Clearly the 
divisions evident in the media, protests, and speeches of 
politicians indicate less support for the Iraq conflict than 
World War II. Yet the public opinion is less in favor of 
military involvement in world affairs, with 36%, the 
highest percentage since 1947, believing that the US 
should stay out of world affairs [4].   
 
An estimated 16,692 Americans died in 2005 due to acts 
of homicide inside the country’s boarders [5].  Another 
41,059 died in 2007 due to motor vehicle crashes a 3.9% 
decline from 2006, which was also the lowest level since 
1994 [6]. The study results show a 1.37 Fatality Rate per 
100 million Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT).  This 
continues that trend estimated roughly as at 3.4/100M 
VMT in 1975. Why is the American public not outraged 
by the deaths with the country’s boarders?  Is it because 
the trend in both homicides and motor vehicle accident 
fatalities is a gradual reduction over time?  I argue that it 
is the public’s perception that one’s individual risk is 
relatively low.  The population of roughly 303 million 
deems 50,000 fatalities a year as being acceptable 
because some other individuals are taking higher than 
necessary risk and that the number of fatalities is 
relatively low when compared to the total exposure. 
Driving while intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, 
or at speeds in great excess of the posted limits are 
examples of taking higher than necessary risks.  The 
current American drives an average of 15,000 miles per 
year which results in a fatality rate of roughly 5.1 x 10-4 
per driver, using the data above.  
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1.1 Reducing Cost per Failure 
 
The monetary cost is another area where each failure of a 
major space system is deemed unacceptable.  The Space 
Shuttle Endeavour cost approximately $1.7 billion (real 
dollars) in 1992, and approximately another $450 million 
per launch [7].  The single unit cost comparison is similar 
to the $2 billion cost of a B-2 aircraft but, much higher 
than the F-22 Raptor at a cost of $137.5 million (2008 
flyaway estimate) [8].  When compared over time, the 
aircrafts’ operational costs are significantly lower due to 
the number of missions in a year and the significantly 
lower cost of maintenance and support activities.  
Similarly, the loss of a single Raptor or mission doesn’t 
necessary imply that the primary system capability is 
lost. Aircraft loses are expected during a conflict and 
would not ground the entire fleet.  Even when a specific 
aircraft type is grounded due to safety issues there are 
enough systems with similar capabilities to ensure that 
the overall capability is not lost, only temporarily 
reduced. The single-day loss of a Space Shuttle mission 
is at least $2.15 billion dollars [7], significantly higher 
than most high-performance military aircraft and at least 
a one year stand-down. 
 
The typical person accepts the choice to become a fighter 
pilot or astronaut as a personal choice to pursue a high-
risk profession. However, the loss of a Space Shuttle or 
the International Space Station is also financial risk of 
the nation and therefore shared by all citizens.  The 
financial cost of the Iraq conflict has been over $845 
billion to the U.S. with a total cost to the economy has 
been estimated at $3 trillion [9]. The public perceives the 
cost of the Iraq conflict, $845 billion and growing, as 
more expensive than the $341 billion spent to fund 
World War II, even though the cost would be $3.89 
trillion after adjusting for inflation. The cost of World 
War II, using 1945 dollars and US population estimates 
based on the census figures would have been $2.25 per 
citizen as compared to $2.78 per citizen for the current 
Iraq conflict. 
 
The public considers a Space Shuttle failure as a much 
higher financial risk than a motor vehicle accident.  This 
is because of three factors: Americans are 76 times more 
likely to be injured in a motor vehicle accident instead of 
being killed [6], the loss of capability is only temporary -
another vehicle is readily available and can be purchased, 
and the majority of drivers have insurance which mitigate 
the financial costs.  
 
The conclusion is that the general population is not 
willing to continue to accept a very high chance of death 
given a very limited exposure time in conjunction with a 
perceived high monetary cost – such as the cost of 
funding a war or space exploration. 
 
2. EVOLVING SAFETY PRACTICES 
 
It is generally accepted that to build safety into a system 
it must be involved early in the development of a system.  
The Constellation Program involved a few key experts 
during the mission concept phase but the staffing and 
involvement of safety in the requirements development 
increased as the program grew.  Safety engineering was 
involved evaluating the design and coordinating 
requirements prior to the completion of the System 
Requirements Review (SRR). The initial design 
evaluation, completed prior to the SRR milestone 
emphasized safety critical functions and aspects of the 
system that were not expected to meet the initial set of 
safety requirements.  By the Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR) the requirements had been updated to reflect the 
physical design limitations, had eliminated or addressed 
many earlier concerns, and effectively communicated 
areas where safety risks remained high. 
 
 
        
       Figure 1. NASA Phasing of System Engineering Tasks 
2.1 Driving Requirements and Design vs. 
Documenting the Design 
 
The primary problem in system safety is that the safety 
analysis in any organization is usually a design cycle 
behind the design. Generally, a designer develops an 
initial design, provides it to the safety engineer, and 
returns to iterating the design while it is being evaluated 
for the first time for safety issues.  The designer has 
already completed his second design iteration by the time 
the safety engineer provides the assessment of the initial 
design. 
 
Ares I decided to jump-start the safety analysis by using 
the vast data already available. Initially a review for 
applicable lessons learned from the history of manned 
launch vehicles, expendable launch vehicles, satellites, 
robotic missions, ISS, and ISS payloads were used to 
generate a significant list of possible hazards and causes 
to help assess the requirements prior to the SDR.  After 
SDR an extensive study of 6093 past launch failures, 
including manned and unmanned launch systems was 
performed.  Each failure was categorized by failure mode 
and then determined if it would be applicable to the Ares 
I system.  Concurrently, Space Shuttle hazard reports 
were reviewed for applicability as well. Initial designs, 
based on shuttle hardware, were evaluated to identify 
areas were the design failed to meet the initial set of 
requirements and to determine if causes of previous 
failures were being considered in the design.  This 
allowed the safety engineering community to make 
earlier recommendations to add or change requirements.  
It also provided a mechanism for safety engineers to 
present information to the design engineer that would be 
helpful early in the program – early enough to drive the 
design and establish a relationship.  The initial efforts are 
represented in the upper left side of Figure 2. 
 
Next, the probability of a given failure mode due to a 
limited set of causes was calculated by using 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA).  This data was then 
used to prioritize work, and develop a list of findings and 
recommendations which were communicated to the 
entire project.   
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                Figure 2. System Safety Analysis Report Maturation Process 
 
2.2 Dependences and Interaction 
 
One can already see how that the design development of 
any complex system has numerous dependencies and 
interactions.  The safety analysis of a system is no 
different, it has dependencies and interactions.  
Unfortunately, those linkages have not been fully 
understood or appreciated until after the design has 
matured through two design cycles.  Remember, the 
safety engineer usually didn’t receive the design until the 
second cycle was starting. The engineering group 
responsible for the design was not made aware of any 
safety issues until well into the second design cycle. 
What can safety contribute prior to and during the first 
design cycle?  Prior to or beginning the first design cycle, 
a new system can be compared to similar known systems, 
such as Ares I use of Space Shuttle hardware data. Then 
requirements to preclude potential weaknesses of the 
known system can be added to the requirements.  
Requirements should be added which ensure that 
previously used failure recover techniques are available.  
The safety organization should also contribute a list of 
possible hazards and causes to the design engineer. The 
discussion of possible hazards and causes allows the 
safety community to better understand the system and the 
planned controls.  It also allows the design community to 
ensure that all the safety aspects of a design are being 
considered.  
 
An example of incorporating safety into the early design 
decisions was when a critical actuator for the Ares I 
design was being selected.  Three single failure tolerant 
options existed: hydraulic, electro-mechanical, and a 
design that incorporated both the hydraulic and electro-
mechanical.  The hydraulic design was based on heritage 
and had known safety issues, the electro-mechanical 
design had few safety issues but more unknowns and 
very little flight heritage, and the last design attempted to 
be fully one failure tolerant through unlike redundancy.  
The last option was eliminated because of the risk of 
manufacturing, servicing, and using two dramatically 
unlike systems created twice the number of risk and 
challenging operability issues.  The remaining two 
options were traded considering design, safety, 
operability, and other issues.  The heritage design was 
selected but the study revealed specific components that 
needed to be re-evaluated due to the different 
environments and loads. 
 
The interdependencies between the design, operability, 
reliability, and safety can be seen in the example.  
However, a number of other relationships are not as 
clear.  The Ares I project is divided into three major 
Elements (First Stage, Upper Stage, and Upper Stage 
Engine) and Vehicle Integration. The Vehicle Integration 
Office has divided tasks into functional areas as 
designated in Figure 3.  The Crew Safety and Reliability 
(CSR) group is assigned risk analysis [Table 1]. 
 
 Figure 3. Overview of Ares Project and Vehicle Integration Office 
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Table 1. Crew Safety and Reliability Working Groups and Responsibilities  
 
These working groups regularly share information and 
communicate results to each other and the design 
community.  The Integrated Aborts group is tasked with 
developing the abort philosophies, the Fault Detection, 
Diagnostics, and Response (FDDR) group identifies 
critical sensors necessary to detect and determine failure 
modes during flight, the PDA develops specific models 
to better understand failure mechanics, the SARA 
working group models the failure effects, such as blast 
effects, to determine the effectiveness on any abort 
options.  The other working groups have recognizable 
deliverables and tasks.  
 
Typically, either the safety or reliability group identifies 
failure cases which the Ascent Risk Analysis working 
group ensures is included in their analysis and is credible. 
When the likelihood of a failure case was relatively high, 
when compared to other failure modes, the PDA group 
would model the failure case to fully understand the 
chain of events leading to and resulting from the failure.  
The Integrated Aborts working group would determine if 
there were sensors which would detect a failure and what 
abort mode(s) would be used.  Lastly, the SARA group 
would determine if the resulting abort would be 
successful by determining if the command module and 
crew would survive the failure effects through numerous 
simulations. These are labor intensive analyses which are 
prioritize to address high-risk areas based on when the 
required data is available. 
 
There remain two relationships to discuss: logistics and 
management.  The relationship between logistics and 
safety is very critical.  It is impossible to identify all 
possible hazards without understanding the flow of 
operations.  Where will hazardous activities, like loading 
of toxic consumables such as hydrazine, take place?  
What precautions (controls) and capability (hardware or 
software) are necessary to safety perform pre-flight and 
contingency maintenance activities?  These types of 
questions drive design changes such as adding 
accommodations for access, such as wider access panels, 
and/or identifying were additional capability, such as 
hazardous gas detection, would allow activities to be 
performed quicker and safer. 
  
The most important relationship is with the design 
community.  The relationship with management is likely 
to be next in importance.  The relationship with 
management important not just because they decide were 
resources will be spent but, because without a good 
working relationship it is extremely difficult to ensure 
that results of safety analyses impact the design.  The 
ideal state is that both the Project Manager and the Chief 
Engineer wants to here the opinion of the safety 
community prior to concurring or making critical design 
decisions.  As a safety engineer, you want a chance for 
your recommendations to be heard and fairly considered. 
 
How can your safety program position itself such that its 
analyses and opinions are sought by management?  Meet 
or exceed management’s expectations.  The goal of any 
manager is to produce a system that works, on-time, and 
within budget. Managers expect detailed schedules, good 
products, feedback on proposed major changes, and 
information that improves the design.  Pitfalls regularly 
include: schedules which fail to produce timely inputs to 
support other groups, inadequate or no evaluation of 
requirements and proposed design changes, products that 
are inconsistent with the current design, lacking 
communications concerning how risk and hazards are 
being identified and shared with the design community 
are just a few examples.  Even early in the design safety 
should participate in trades.  Keep a record of where 
safety’s input was or could have been the driver for the 
design.  Often safety takes the position of a requirement 
enforcer, telling engineering and management why the 
design is unacceptable but not providing any suggestion 
on how to resolve the unacceptable condition.  
Sometimes this is necessary but it should be avoided.  
Instead communicate the issue and focus on arriving at a 
resolution.  Can the design be changed? If the design can 
not meet the requirement as written can it meet the intent 
of the requirement?  Focus on changing the design where 
it lowers the overall risk of the system.  By impacting the 
design, coordinating tasks with other groups, and 
working the high risk items first; you will focus on value-
added work which reduces redesign cycles and 
effectively lowers the cost of the safety analysis for the 
project.  
 
The Ares I System Safety Analysis (SSAR) report, along 
with other CSR deliverables, summarizes the safety 
analysis process, results of the analyses, and provides 
findings and recommendations for project management 
to consider for emphasis during the next design cycle. 
Management can evaluate the recommendations in the 
SSAR against the level of detail in other engineering 
documentation and decide which areas of the system 
need additional attention.  The decision is based upon 
being well-informed early in the design cycle, including 
the safety risks. In past NASA programs the safety 
analysis was often a design cycle behind or just 
documenting the hazards and causes and existing 
controls in the system without being able to influence the 
design decisions.  
 
3. GOALS, EXPECTATIONS, AND PLANNING 
 
There are key activities any safety organization involved 
in space exploration must perform to support system 
development. It must develop and well-define the system 
goals and the goals of the group supporting the safety 
effort. Understand the expectations of multiple customers 
of the safety organization and fully explain the 
implications of those expectations down to the design 
engineer.  Lastly, perform the short and long-term 
planning to ensure that the results of safety analyses 
impact design and ensure sufficient resources exist to 
accomplish the defined tasks. 
 
3.1 Ares I Safety Goals 
 
The driving goal of the Ares I safety organization is: 
Prevent the Loss of Life during a mission.  This can be 
broken down into multiple sub-goals which can also be 
divided into lower level goals as depicted in Table 2. 
 
Constellation Program Goals (A partial list) 
1.1. Develop a crew launch vehicle to provide transportation to 
LEO as close to 2010 as possible to minimize the gap with 
Shuttle retirement 
1.2. Provide a substantial increase in safety and reliability in the 
launch phase compared to present human transportation 
systems. 
1.3. Provide a launch vehicle system that supports a substantial 
reduction in total mission operation costs compared to present 
human transportation systems. 
Ares Project Goals ( A partial list) 
2.1. Ensure flight/ground safety, while meeting system 
performance requirements and achieving mission objectives. 
(1.1,1.2)  
2.2. Utilize current, proven technology in the designs of the 
Ares I and Ares V. (1.2, 1.3) 
2.3. Implement the Integrated Logistics Support approach and 
methodologies at the earliest stages to achieve the lowest 
ownership costs. (1.3)   
Vehicle Integration Goals (Technical Performance Metrics) 
3.1. Mass to Orbit (2.1) 
3.2. Loss of Mission (2.1) 
3.3. Launch pad processing time. (2.3, 2.3) 
Crew Safety and Reliability Goals (A partial list) 
4.1. Generate a integrated vehicle level PRA estimate (Loss of 
Mission / Loss of Crew) (3.2) 
4.2. Ensure that abort conditions and necessary sensors are 
identified (3.2) 
4.3. Eliminate or control safety hazards and their causes 
through design (3.2) 
Safety Working Group Goals (A partial list) 
5.1. No Loss of Life (Public, Flight or Ground Crew) (4.1, 4.2, 
4.3) 
5.2. No Ares I failures which trigger an abort over the program 
life (4.1, 4.3) 
5.3. No repeat “Lesson Learned”(4.2, 4.3) 
5.4. Impact the design based on hazard analyses (4.1, 4.2, 4.3) 
5.5. Pass all Constellation Safety and Engineering Review 
Panel (CSERP) reviews (4.2, 4.3) 
Table 2. Example of the Flow-down of Safety Goals 
 
Under the goal 5.2: “No Ares I failures which trigger an 
abort over the program life” are a number of sub-goals 
/functions which must be accomplished to be successful.  
While the list of goals is not complete here it is easy to 
see how individual engineers can use one or more as 
guidance on where to focus their efforts. It allows the 
engineer to communicate goals and prioritize task related 
to the hazards that they are assigned. 
 
3.2 Expectations of the Ares I Safety Organization 
 
The Ares I management expects the safety organization 
to identify any safety issues, communicate those issues to 
the engineering community, and elevate to 
management’s attention any high risk or one which an 
acceptable solution can not be agreed upon.  Besides 
generating hazard reports with causes, controls, and 
verification; formally identifying and elevating risk 
items, generating Review Item Discrepancies, and 
presentations at meetings are also used to highlight high-
risk areas.  Management also expects the safety 
organization to successfully pass all Constellation Safety 
and Engineering Review Panel (CSERP) reviews.  The 
CSERP is a group of engineering experts that are funded 
by the Constellation Program and are not funded or 
accountable to the Level III projects, such as Ares or 
Orion.  They function as an independent review board 
concerned primarily with the safety aspects of the 
system. The CSERP has a phased review approach 
similar to that which has been successfully applied to the 
Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP).  Unfortunately, a 
phased safety review process for a developmental project 
is new and untried process. The safety organization must 
coordinate inputs and support from the engineering 
community and other projects as necessary to support 
reviews.  Action Items and agreements must be answered 
and a number of meetings scheduled to be effective.   
 
A key expectation within the Ares I safety organization is 
ownership of hazard reports.  Ownership requires that the 
safety engineer identify tasks to be accomplished to 
support the delivery schedule, identify key points of 
contact, participate in meetings regularly, plan to  hazard 
report development (inputs needed, key dates, analysis 
methods, needed support), discuss plan with the right 
design teams, and finally document.  Ownership of 
hazard reports will encourage engineers to communicate 
issues and concerns sooner rather than later. Both 
management and designers need regular analysis updates 
and results, identification of requirement gaps, and an 
explanation of what assumptions and documents were 
used as inputs. Overall the expectation is to deliver high-
quality products, not just hazard reports, in time to 
influence the design.   
 
3.3 Planning for Success 
 
Strategic planning is one of the keys to being effective by 
providing timely technical assessments.  One must first 
know the major program and project milestones.  The 
next critical step is to determine the goals of the safety 
analysis team.  A goal such as: “No Ares I failures which 
trigger an abort over the program life” or “Pass all 
CSERP reviews” are clear and defined. These must be 
further divided into deliverables and tasks which can be 
completed. After the content of deliverables, their inputs, 
and due dates have been identified the relationship with 
other groups can be defined.  Remember that the more 
your products are used the greater value you have to the 
project.  The amount of involvement and communication 
with other groups will partially be based upon the 
deliverables and expectations of management and any 
reporting requirements. However, more information in 
reports, official documents, or in briefing formats may 
also be required to communicate the issues effectively.  
 
Always ensure enough resources are available to 
communicate concerns and participate in trade studies or 
analyses which will not be scheduled in the original 
planning.  Resource planning must also include vacations 
and training of personnel.  Engineers that are asked to 
continually work at stressful levels without any vacations 
or lulls in the level of activity will either burn-out or 
leave to pursue other opportunities. Training is necessary 
to prevent the engineer from developing tunnel-vision 
when examining their assigned system. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
If space exploration is to continue, safety must increase 
and the overall cost must continue to be reduced. Safety 
can only increase through incorporating the right safety 
requirements into the program and the necessary 
hardware controls earlier in the design cycles than the 
majority of prior major NASA systems.  The safety risks 
must be clearly communicated to the public along with 
the benefits of technology development and scientific 
discovery.  The public must perceive that the economic 
benefits of space exploration outweigh any potential 
shared financial risk –which was accomplished on ISS by 
sharing the cost and risk. The hazard analysis, along with 
a number of supporting analyses must be fully integrated 
from the beginning of the design concept phase to reduce 
development and long-term operational costs. 
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♦Population is increasing faster than the number of U.S. homicides
• Number of homicides is relatively stable since 1998
• Slight decrease points to continued population growth
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Comparison of Fatality Statistics
♦Significant differences in exposed individuals
• WWII losses are an order of magnitude higher after considering 
exposure rates
• Homicides considers entire U.S. population – increasing over time
• Motor vehicle fatalities considers all drivers – increasing over time
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Annual Risk
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Annual Relative Risks Comparisons
♦ Unacceptable Risk
• 1E-03 Threshold
• Generally not 
accepted
♦ Marginal Risk
• 1E-06 to 1E-03
• Accepted but 
considered a 
high-risk by the 
public
♦ Acceptable Risk
• 1E-06 Threshold
• No additional 
mitigations 
necessary
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Crew Safety and Reliability Tasks
WBS 5.2.7 - Crew Safety and Reliability
Working Group Deliverables Assigned Tasks
Ascent Risk 
Analysis
Ares I Crew Safety and Reliability 
Ascent Risk Analysis Report
• Provide integrated vehicle level PRA estimate 
• Identify key risk drivers and potential areas of improvement
• Document ground rules and assumptions
Fault Detection, 
Diagnostics, 
and Response 
Ares I Abort Conditions Report • Identify abort conditions, assess which conditions must be monitored
Ares I Abort Failure Detection and 
Response System Definition 
Document
• Define abort algorithms
• Develop/ document abort architecture and recovery management 
• Sensor qualification logic
Integrated Aborts Ares I Integrated Aborts Plan • Outline approach and methods to support aborts
Probabilistic 
Design 
Analysis
Abort Risk Assessment Engineering 
Memorandum
• Physics-based analyses to assess severity of failure environments
• Monte Carlo simulations of failure environments
• Input to loss-of-crew estimate
• Document modeling ground rules and assumptions
Reliability Ares I Integrated failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis and Critical 
Items List
• Identify failure modes and results to the vehicle
• Eliminate critical failure modes
• Establish risk retention rationale
Safety Ares I System Safety Analysis 
Report (SSAR)
• Provide recommend actions with regard to safety risks
• Document hazard reports and FTA findings
• Summarize critical/high-risk events
Ares I Fault Tree Analysis Report 
(FTA)
• Identify initiating failure causes including non-hardware causes
9National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Relationships Between CSR Groups
Generates Risk Estimate
Likelihood
Severity
Failure Modes of components
Failure Causes (Hardware 
focused)
Effects (LRU – Subsystem –
Mission/Vehicle)
Retention Rationale
Redundancy screens
Contained/ Uncontained Failures
Controls (Generic initially 
evolving to Specific)
Failure Causes (Hardware, 
Environments, 
Human Factors, and 
Combined Effects)
Top Failure Events
Survival /Contingency Actions
FMEA / CIL Attributes Integrated Hazard Report Attributes
Generates List of Single-
Point Failures
Relationships
Mutual Impacts
Impacts FMEA/CIL
Impacts IHRs
Verifications (Generic initially 
evolving to Specific)
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Example of FMEA/CIL and Hazards Interactions
Mutual Impacts
♦ Compare FMEA – Failure Causes and HR – Failure Causes which provides additional information to 
both analyses
♦ Compare FMEA – Effects (Mission/Vehicle) and HR – Top Failure Events and all HRs to confirm end 
effects and effects are captured which may result in modification of FMEA Retention Rationale or 
additional HRs.
♦ Comparison of the FMEA – Contained/Uncontained Failures and HR – Severity, Survival methods is 
used to confirm separate conclusions and the HR will also define any contingency actions which may 
be used to prevent harm to the vehicle or crew.
Impacts FMEA/CIL
♦ HR – Failure Causes  may result in additional FMEA - Failure modes 
♦ HR – Failure Causes  may result in updating the FMEA/CIL - Retention Rationale based on new 
information.
Impacts IHRs
♦ FMEA – Failure Modes could result in additional Top Level Failures or a change in scope of  specific 
HRs.
♦ FMEA – Retention Rationale can result in both adding/deleting failure causes of a particular hazard
♦ FMEA – Retention Rationale may be used to justify or update HR – Likelihood and/or add failure 
causes based on information in the Retention Rationale.
♦ FMEA – Retention Rationale may be used to justify or update HR – Controls based on information in 
the Retention Rationale.
♦ FMEA – Contained/Uncontained Failure field would impact which survival or contingency actions that 
would be effective given the failure mode.
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Goals Flow-Down
Vehicle Integration Goals (Technical Performance Metrics)
3.1. Mass to Orbit (2.1)
3.2. Loss of Mission (2.1)
3.3. Launch pad processing time. (2.3, 2.3)
Crew Safety and Reliability Goals (A partial list)
4.1. Generate a integrated vehicle level PRA estimate (Loss of
Mission / Loss of Crew) (3.2)
4.2. Ensure that abort conditions and necessary sensors are
identified (3.2)
4.3. Eliminate or control safety hazards and their causes through
design (3.2)
Safety Working Group Goals (A partial list)
5.1. No Loss of Life (Public, Flight or Ground Crew) (4.1, 4.2,
4.3)
5.2. No Ares I failures which trigger an abort over the program
life (4.1, 4.3)
5.3. No repeat “Lesson Learned”(4.2, 4.3)
5.4. Impact the design based on hazard analyses (4.1, 4.2, 4.3)
5.5. Pass all Constellation Safety and Engineering Review Panel
(CSERP) reviews (4.2, 4.3)
Constellation Program Goals (A partial list)
1.1. Develop a crew launch vehicle to provide transportation to
LEO as close to 2010 as possible to minimize the gap with
Shuttle retirement
1.2. Provide a substantial increase in safety and reliability in the
launch phase compared to present human transportation
systems.
1.3. Provide a launch vehicle system that supports a substantial
reduction in total mission operation costs compared to present
human transportation systems.
Ares Project Goals ( A partial list)
2.1. Ensure flight/ground safety, while meeting system
performance requirements and achieving mission objectives.
(1.1,1.2)
2.2. Utilize current, proven technology in the designs of the Ares I
and Ares V. (1.2, 1.3)
2.3. Implement the Integrated Logistics Support approach and
methodologies at the earliest stages to achieve the lowest
ownership costs. (1.3)
Vehicle Integration Goals (Technical Performance Metrics)
3.1. Mass to Orbit (2.1)
3.2. Loss of Mission (2.1)
3.3. Launch pad processing time. (2.3, 2.3)
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System Safety Analysis Report Maturation Process
Ares I Fault Tree Analysis –
All Versions
Lessons Learned –
55 directly applicable
Review Of STS HRs –
Applicable, Applicable w/ 
mod, Not Applicable
Launch Vehicle 
History Review
•6093 launches
•653 failures
•399 Applicable to Ares I Inputs from:
•Ares Elements/ Engineering
•Ares Trade Studies
•Ground 
•Orion
•Other CSRT Products
Updated Ares I 
Hazard Reports –
Appendix B
Inputs from four (4) 
CSERP TIMs
System Safety 
Analysis Report –
PDR Version
System Safety 
Analysis Report –
SDR Version
Ares I Preliminary 
Hazards List
Key
Document
Inputs
Continuous Interactions 
Ares I Vehicle Integration 
Hazard Reports
System Safety 
Analysis Report –
SRR Version
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Ares I Shared Attributes
♦Development History
• Pre-SRR and Pre-SDR review of STS HRs.
• Pre-SRR Lessons Learned review produced 55 directly applicable 
items, 35 from manned missions and 20 from ELVs.
• Reviewed over 6093 launches including 653 failures or which 399 
(appx. 61%) were judged as applicable to Ares I.
• The IFTA and SSAR will be formally base-lined after CDR at which point 
it will be under configuration control
• The IFTA and SSAR is a “living documents” that will be updated 
throughout the life of the Constellation Program
♦The Ares I IFTA and SSAR serves as input data to multiple related 
analyses (e.g., FDDR, Abort Conditions Report, Ascent Risk 
Analysis, Logistics Support Analysis, etc.)
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Ares I Safety Generated Documents
♦ Ares I Fault Tree Analysis 
Report (FTA)
♦ Purpose:
• Primary objective was to 
identify initiating causes 
which could result in the top 
undesired event – Loss of 
Life (Flight crew, ground crew 
& public)
• The analysis logic is 
structured such that mission 
phase (time), system failures 
of any element or interface, 
and all environments are 
considered
♦ Ares I System Safety Analysis 
Report (SSAR)
♦ Purpose:
• Provide an overview of the results 
of the FTA and all integrated 
vehicle Hazard reports
• Provides summaries of the vehicle, 
operations, and timeline of critical/ 
high-risk events to assist reader to 
understand the analysis
• Provides critical recommendations 
to management to address 
identified areas of high 
safety/mission risks
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FTA Overview
♦Primary objective was to identify initiating causes which could 
result in the top undesired event – Loss of Life (Flight crew, 
ground crew & public)
♦The Fault Tree Analysis only addresses integrated vehicle 
failures – Element failures leading to overall loss of 
vehicle/mission are addressed in Element FTAs. Integrated 
failures due to Element specific causes are captured through 
transfers.
♦FTA is a “living document” that will undergo numerous 
updates prior to CDR
♦Ground rules and Assumptions are included in the document
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FTA Snapshot - Example
♦ Example: Top block Loss of Life 
(Flight crew, ground crew & public)
♦ Divided by Mission Phase
• Failures From Pad Arrival to T-0
• Non-traditional but assisted in 
evaluating functions at different 
times and conditions
♦ Ares Internal (VI) Transfer
• Triangle to page within VI
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FTA Snapshot - Example
♦ Subdivided by VI Hazard Report as necessary
• Hazard Reports are color-coded
♦ HR – ARESI-INTG-ENVR-001 highlighted
• “Events that are Considered Abortable (TBD)” is 
undeveloped in lower right diagram
• Triangle transfer indicates branch is further 
developed elsewhere 
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FTA Analysis Results
♦The analysis logic reflects the physical failure methods by 
including all environments, Element specific causes, and 
possible combinations from multiple sources  
♦The report documents all known failure causes and tracks those 
relationships through transfers with Ares Elements (FS, US, and 
USE) and other Constellation projects (Orion, Ground, etc.)
♦ The FTA feeds into the System Safety Analysis Report through 
the multiple hazard reports
♦FTA contains a high level of detail for an integrated system at 
this design phase
• All mission phases
• Consistent with division of hazard report and content
• Many levels in depth to capture critical interactions at the integrated level
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SSAR Overview
♦The System Safety Analysis Report is the combined results of 
the FTA, lessons learned, applicable STS hazard reports, and 
independent analyses 
♦The report documents all know failure causes and tracks those 
relationships through transfers with Ares Elements (FS, US, and 
USE) and other Constellation projects (Orion, Ground, etc.)
• Executive summary section
• Provides nine (9) specific areas/issues identified during the analysis
• Section with summaries of all VI hazard reports
• Individual Hazard Reports and supporting sections of the FTA are 
located in Appendices
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Expectations
♦Communicate issues and concerns sooner rather than later. 
♦Support milestone project reviews of both the VI and Elements –
plan to develop HR (inputs needed, key dates, analysis 
methods, needed support) discuss plan with the right design 
teams, - document.  
• Deliver high-quality products on time.  Includes information that the 
designers and management needs to understand, regularly update 
analysis and results, document inputs and assumptions, address gaps 
and requirements as analysis identifies them. 
♦Support the Constellation Safety and Engineering Review Panel
♦Ownership of Hazard reports, agreement that identified work 
can be accomplished to support the 
• Delivery schedule,
• Identify key points of contact 
• Participate in meetings regularly 
• Identify tasks, 
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Planning and Communication
♦Strategic planning is one of the keys to being effective 
• Support program and project milestones 
• Define deliverables or tasks to be completed 
• Set goals of the safety analysis team - such as: “No Ares I failures which 
trigger an abort over the program life” 
• Timely technical assessments
♦Communicate with other groups and organizations -
Remember that the more your products are used the greater value 
you have to the project!
• Deliverables including content and limitations
• Input needed for analysis 
• Identify due dates 
• Define relationship with other groups
• Effectively communicate in multiple forums: reports, official documents, or 
briefing
22National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Conclusion
If space exploration is to continue, safety must increase and the 
overall cost must continue to be reduced. 
♦Early involvement
♦ Increase safety through incorporating the right safety requirements 
into the program and the necessary hardware controls earlier
♦Participated in all design cycles 
♦The hazard analysis, along with a number of supporting analyses 
must be fully integrated from the beginning of the design concept 
phase
♦Reduce the number of design cycles, development costs, and long-
term operational costs by coordinating work across multiple 
disciplines
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